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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
On August 26,1987, Jennifer Hill and Berry McKeever, two Stanford 
University student-athletes, filed this complaint against the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association,^ alleging that the NCAA's drug testing 
program violated their constitutional right to privacy. (2 CT 26.)
After the trial in Februaiy and March of 1988, the trial court 
permanently enjoined the NCAA from enforcing any aspect of its drug 
testing program against Stanford or its students. (1 R.T 54) The court found 
that the test program: (1) embarrasses and degrades student-athletes; (2) 
interferes with an individual's right to medical confidentiality; (3) interferes 
with a student-athlete's medical treatment, and; (4) amounts to an attempt to 
control the athlete's personal and private off-the-field conduct by a form of 
technological surveillance. In September 1990, the California Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's findings. Hill v. National Collegiate 
AthletLc Ass'n. 223 Cal. App. 3d 1642, 1675 (1990)
The appeals court further concluded that the NCAA cannot require 
student-athletes to waive their constitutional rights in order to receive the 
benefit of participating in intercollegiate athletics. In applying the three part 
Bagley test to make this determination, the court held that: (1) the evidence 
does not support the NCAA’s claim that there is significant drug use among 
student athletes; (2) drug testing does not protect a student-athlete’s health 
and safeTy or the integrity of NCAA competition, and; (3) there are 
alternatives to testing that are less offensive to the right of privacy than 
urinalysis drug testing such as drug education Id at 1637. The court found
^Hereinafter, "NCAA" and "Stanford."
that the testing program is too broad, its accuracy doubtful and the appeal 
procedure inadequate. Therefore, what usefulness the program has does not 
manifestly outweigh the resulting impairment of the constitutional right to 
privacy. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1675.
The National Collegiate Athletic Association appeals from the order 
enjoining it from drug testing Stanford University students-athletes. (2 C.T. 
42.) This court granted review on December 20,1990.
Statement of Facts
Approximately two weeks before he was to participate in the 1987 Gator 
Bowl, respondent Bany McKeever, linebacker for Stanford's football team, 
was tested for drugs by the NCAA^
Mr. McKeever's first exposure to the testing program was at the 
beginning of the 1986-87 football season when the NCAA asked him to 
consent^ to the drug testing in writing or give up playing the sport he had 
played since age 14. (2 R.T 380; 1.) The NCAA maintains that an athlete has a 
legitimate option not to sign the consent form. (2 R.T. 408: 21-26; 409: 8-9.) In 
Mr. McKeever^s words, the NCAA .. said it [the form] was voluntary but 
we had to sign it." (2 R.T. 382:12.) Rather than give up the sport that defines 
who he is (2 R.T. 409: 7.), Mr. McKeever signed the consent form.
At the drug test Mr. McKeever had to produce a urine sample. An 
NCAA official accompanied him to the bathroom and watched him urinate 
from a distance of five to seven feet. (2 RT. 389: 17-25.) Mr. McKeever found
^This brief does not deal with co-plaintiff Jennifer Hill's situation, 
testimony has been provided.
NCAA Constitution (2 CT. 129.)
student athlete's ineligibility for participation In all intercolleeiate activity"
the prospect of urinating in fron of an NCAA monitor -abhorrent" (S RC 2), 
and noted that perhaps the hardest part of the test was that it was not 
“voluntary - (2 RT. 390: 5.) After producing the sample Mr. McKeever 
returned to the processing area where he waited in line with a beaker of his 
urine (2 RT. 391: 12-13.) to complete the testing procedure. The entire test 
took “at least two hours" (2 RT. 392:18.), after which numerous media 
reporters interrogated Mr. McKeever and his teammates about the test. (2 
R.T. 393: 7-12.)
The NCAA drug tests student-athletes even though its own 1983 study 
showed student-athletes are less likely to use drugs than their fellow students. 
(1 RT. 77:10-24.) As defense expert Dr. Daniel Hanley admitted, the great 
majority of student-athletes simply do not abuse drugs. (1 RT. 125: 21-24.) 
Results of the NCAA’s 1986-87 drug testing program bear this out: of 3,511 
tested males only 34, less than one percent, tested positive. (J.A. 358-360.) 31 
of the positives were from football players. From 1987-1988 only 21 athletes 
tested positive, all of whom were football players. (S.RC. 6) From 1986 to 
1987 no women in any sport tested positive. (2 CT. 51: 9.)
Nevertheless, the NCAA tests all men and women in all sports for the 
presence of 2,600 different drugs. (S.RC 6.) Remarkably, this list is not 
inclusive, as each drug category ends with the qualifier "and related 
compounds." (2 C.T. 101.) Numerous physicians testified that the all- 
inclusive nature of the banned-drug list interferes with the physician’s ability 
to treat the athlete. (S.RC 2.)^ TTie drug list, because of its size, makes it —
^Mr. McKeever testified that his trainer forbade him from taking any drugs that might show 
up on the test (2 RT. 411: 21-26; 2 RT. 412: 1-2) He could only take such drugs in "life or 
death" situations (2 RT. 411: 24 26.) Although this is hyperbole, it demonstrates the concern 
athletes, coaches and physicians have about an athlete accidentally testing positive at an 
NCAA drug test.
difficult for the student-athlete to modify his or her behavior to assure a 
negative drug test.
Because of the list’s broad scope, the NCAA requires student-athletes to 
declare any drug that may possibly result in a positive test. Thus, an athlete 
may have to divulge very personal information, such as the use of birth 
control pills, which can result in a positive test. (1 R.T 60: 23-25.) On a less 
personal level, athletes must also declare ingestion of a myriad of everyday 
items that will result in a positive drug test, such as herbal tea, numerous 
cold medications, nasal sprays and many other over-the-counter drugs. (1 RT 
21: 9-10; 1 R.T. 60: 23-25; 2 CT. 101.)
Despite unrebutted testimony and evidence that student-athletes are 
less likely to use drugs than non-athletes, (1 R.T. 125: 21-23; 2 C.T. 139) the 
NCAA still believes it must subject them to drug testing to protect their 
Tiealth and safety" and 'insure that no athlete might have an artificially 
induced advantage over others." 1987-88 NCAA Drug Testing Prop-am 
Manual, at 2. Trial testimony revealed that these concerns are not justified 
by the facts.
For example, many of the drugs on the list, far from being harmful, are 
designed to improve the health of the user. (S.R.C 6.) Several physicians 
testified that banning useful medications may harm the health and safety of 
athletes who decline to take needed medication rather than risk a positive 
drug test. (S.RC 8.) Additionally, there is no evidence that any college 
athlete h^s ever been injured or has injured anyone else during competition 
because of drug use. (S.RC. 8.) Although some of the drugs, such as steroids 
and cocaine, are unquestionably harmful to one's health (S.RC. 1.), NCAA 
policy makers have testified that drug use can be curbed through education
and counseling without resorting to punitive drug testing measures. (S.R.C 
10.)
The NCAAs Special Drug Committee, which was established to create 
the drug-testing program, concluded that drugs do not enhance athletic - 
performance. (S.R.C. 6.) Medical science is simply unsure if any drug is 
capable of enhancing athletic performance. (2 R.T. 252: 24,1 RT. 84:12-17 
[steroids!; 2 RT. 272; 25-26 [cocaine]; 2 RT. 275:11 [marijuanat 2 RT 281: 20-22 
[amphetamines].) Defendant's expert Dr. Hanley agrees that most drugs do 
not enhance performance (1 RT 80: 23-25.), and admits that his own studies 
show no consistent drug-induced benefit to a well-trained athlete. (1 R.T. 82; 
26-83; 2.) Although plaintiff and defense experts generally agreed that some 
drugs may have a placebo effect on an athlete, (S RC. 8; 2 RT. 261: 14-19.), this 
effect is highly speculative and intertwined with numerous intangibles that 
effect an athlete's performance (2 C.T. 260; 1-6.)
Standard Of Review
When determining the validity of an injunction, the reviewing court 
lookisl at the evidence presented to the trial court to determine if there was 
substantial support for the trial court's determination that the plaintiff was 
entitled to the relief granted." Monogram Industries. Inc, v Sar Industries. 
Inc^ 64 Cal. App. 3d 697, 703 (1976). On appeal, "all presumptions favor. . . [the 
trial court's power to judge credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in 
testimony, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences! and the trial court's 
findings on such matters, whether express or implied, must be upheld if they
are supported by substantial evidence." People v. T.evha, 29 Cal. 3d 591, 596-597 
(1981).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Did the trial court correctly find that the NCAA urinalysis drug 
testing program violates the California Constitution's guaranteed 
right to privacy because the program is unnecessary, overly broad 
and of doubtful accuracy?
2. Did the trial court properly find that the NCAA cannot condition 
participation in college athletics upon the waiver of a student- 
athlete's guaranteed right to privacy?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Contrary to the unanimous opinion of the appellate court, appellant 
the NCAA contends: (1) that the trial court made an error of law in requiring 
it to demonstrate a "compelling interest" for its drug testing program and, (2) 
that substantial evidence did not support the permanent injunction against 
the NCAA's urinalysis drug testing of Stanford University athletes. These 
contentions are entirely contrary to California law and the detailed findings of 
the trial and appellate courts, both of which found that a broad range of law 
and fact support this injunction.
California law unequivocally holds that its constitutional right to 
privacy applies to private as well as governmental entities. "Privacy is 
protected not merely against state action; it is considered an inalienable right 
which may not be violated by anyone. Porten v. University of San Francisco. 
64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 820 (1976). Contrary to the NCAA’s assertion, a 
Californian's right to privacy is not dependent on who is infringing that 
ri^t. The NCAA’s interpretation of California’s right to privacy would 
wrench away the protective shield of privacy from millions of Califomiai^ 
This interpretation is constitutionally nonsensical.
This Court and numerous appellate courts also unequivocally hold 
that any infringement of a Californian's right to privacy must be justified by a 
"compelling interest." White v. Davis. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775 (1975); Sibi Soroka 
V.-Davton Hudson Corp 91 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13204,13207. The difficulty 
of proving a "compelling interest" safeguards a Californian's right to privacy.
Contrary to California case law and California’s constitution, the 
NCAA contends that the right to privacy should be protected with the weaker 
"reasonableness standard" of Wilkinson v Times Mirror Corp, 215 
Cal.App.3d 1034 (1989), or the federal Fourth Amendment “laalancing test." 
Californians, however, clearly intended that the right to privacy "should be 
abridged only where there is a compelling public need." Ballot Pamp.. 
Proposed Amends, to Cal. Const, with Arguments to Voters. Gen. Elec. (Nov
7, 1972), at 27-28. As one court notes, the elevation of the right to privacy to 
constitutional stature was intended to expand privacy rights. Porten v. 
University of San Francisco. 64 Cal. App. 3d at 829. A lesser standard would 
flout the will of California's voters and violate their right to amend their 
own constitution.
The NCAA did not show at trial that it had a "compelling interest" in 
testing student-athletes for drugs. Although the NCAA claims a "compelling 
interest" in protecting the health and safety of student-athletes and insuring 
that no athlete has a drug-induced advantage over another, Preface. The 1987- 
88 NCAA Drug Testing Manual, at 2, the court found that the concerns used 
to justifyjhe policy are unfounded. __
Less than 1% of the athletes tested from 1986-1988 tested positive, 
almost all of which were for steroid use in the sport of football. Student- 
athletes do not use drugs any more than the general student
population: (2 CT. 138.) As the NCAA’s own expert admitted, the great 
majority of student-athletes simply do not abuse drugs. (1 R.T. 125: 21-24.)
Additionally, on a c^ualitative level there is no "compelling" reason to 
test student-athletes for drugs. Even in federal drug testing cases using the 
less stringent Fourth Amendment "balancing test," see. e.g_ Skinner v. 
Raih^y Labor Executive’s Ass’n 489 U.S. 602 (1989), the key consideration in 
assessing the validity of a drug test is the potential harm a tested class poses to 
society unless it is tested for drugs. Because of the clear danger intoxicated 
train operators pose to the public. Skinner upheld drug testing of this class of 
federal employee. The "safety rationale" of Skinner simply is not present 
with regard to student-athletes.
No student-athlete has injured him or herself or others during athletic 
competition because of drug use. (S.R.C 8.) The NCAA does not have the 
right to protect some athletes "from themselves" at the cost of the privacy of 
the great majority of student-athletes who do not use drugs. Neither 
California or federal law allows drug testing to patemalistically protect the 
"health and safety" of its citizens, especially when fundamental rights are 
violated in the process. See, e.g.. Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation 218 
Cal. App. 3d 1; Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive's Assoc.. 489 U.S. 602.
Last, the NCAA could not show that drugs could give an athlete an 
unfair athletic advantage over another. The NCAA's own drug committee 
determined that drugs do not enhance athletic performance. (S.R.C. 6.) 
ThwartecLon this front, the NCAA argues that it has a right to drug test to— 
counter the public perception that dmgs threaten the integrity of college 
sports. It does not. The NCAA cannot sacrifice the privacy rights of college
athletes simply to counter the inaccurate public perception that its sports are 
not "clean."
Unable to prevail on a "compelling interest" argument, the NCAA 
contends that student-athletes waive their constitutional right to privacy by 
signing the NCAA drug testing consent form. Even though the NCAA is not 
obliged to provide a sports program, once it does so, it cannot selectively 
confer the privilege on a basis that excludes those who seek to exercise a 
constitutional right, Committee To Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers. 29 
Cal. 3d 2 252, 262 (1981), unless it can satisiy the three-prong Bagiev test 
justifying the unequal treatment. Bagiev v. Washington Township Hospital 
Dist.. 65 Cal. 2d 499, 505 (1966).
The NCAA's drug testing program does not satisfy this test. The 
evidence shows that the program: (1) is incapable of advancing its proffered 
compelling interest;" (2) impairs the right to privacy disproportionately to 
its utility, and; (3) can be accomplished through means less offensive" to the 
right of privacy.
This Court is required to examine and rule upon the validity of 
governmental and business activities that encroach upon the California’s 
constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy. The trial and appellate courts 
did so in the instant case, and enjoined the NCAA from further drug testing 
of student-athletes.
ARGUMENT
I. CALIFORNIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY LIMITS 
PRIVATE AS WELL AS STATE ACTION.
The NCAA mistakenly asserts that the California constitutional 
guaranty of privacy does not extend to private action. It is an accepted 
principle that the right to privacy limits private as well as state action. Luck
y^gput^grn Pacific Transportation Cn 218 Cal. App. 3d 1, 19 (1990)6, 
V^lkingon V. Times Mirror Cotp 215 Cal App. 3d at 1043. TTie distinction 
between "public" and "private" invasions of privacy are "distinctions without 
a difference in the context of the state constitutional right to privacy." Sibi 
Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp. 91 Daily Journal D.AR at 13207. "Any 
expectations of privacy would indeed be illusory if only the government's 
collection and retention of data were restricted " Wilkinson v. Times Mirrnr
' Cal. App. 3d at 1043. See, also. Semore v Pool 217 Cal. App. 3d 
1087, 1094 (1990).
II. ONLY A "COMPELLING INTEREST" JUSTIFIES INVADING A
CALIFORNIAN'S CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT TO 
PRIVACY.
It is an "accepted principle of existing law that a violation of the right to 
privacy may only be justified by a compelling interest." Sibi Soroka v. Davtnn 
Hudson Corp,, 91 Daily Journal D.AR. 13207, White v. Davis 13 Cal. 3d at 
775. This principle is based on the legislative history of California's right to 
privacy amendment of 1972^, and is consistent with this Court's pre-1972 
approach to governmental infringement of other fundamental constitutional 
lagley v. Washington Township 65 Cal. 2d at 501 ("only a
compelling" public interest can justify the imposition of restraints upon the 
political activities of public employees."!
V Southern pactfic Tran^iportation Cq. 218 Cal. App 3d 1. involved a suit brought 
against a pnvate employer who had fired an employee for mfusing to take a urine teit The
^st^hL M.! aU9.''''^^‘^ enrployer is bound by the privacy pmvisions of the California
^The ballot argument for the amendment reads that the right to privacy "should be abridged 
OTly where there is a compelling public need" Ballot Famp , Proposed Amends In ral rL.. 
with arguments to voters Gen, Elec iNnv 7 ion; .. nr.-ie ------------------------ —
A. Ihe Wilkinson rourt'? holding that Califomi;.-.; right tn
fee infringed gs long as the infringement is Reasonable** is ronfratY 
IQ. California law and the California Constitution.
\^lkin?op V, Timgs Mlrmr rogi. 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1047, incorrectly 
held that an invasion of privacy need not be justified by a compelling interest 
if the invasion is “reasonable.” In departing from the traditional 
“compelling interest" test, the court, while acknowledging that drug testing 
“implicates important personal rights," declined to find that a job applicant's 
pnvacy nghts had been substantially burdened because the drug testing was 
consensual and the testing procedures were designed to "minimize the 
intrusion into individual privacy." Id. at 1049-1050.
However, in Sjbi Soroka v Davton Hudson Corp. 91 Daily Journal 
D.AR. 13204, Division Four rejected this reasoning and found the ballot 
argument that California voters endorsed clearly intended that a violation of 
the constitutional right to privacy can only be justified by showing a 
“compelling interest." Id. at 13207. Therefore, the court concluded that 
inconsistent with both the legislative history of Article I, 
Section I of the California Constitution and the case law interpreting that 
provision, and declined to follow its ruling. M at 13207. The court held that 
the trial court had abused its discretion by committing an error of law in
applying the reasonableness test rather than the compelling interest test. Mat 
13208.
afei Soroka is clearly more consistent with the spirit and letter of 
California constitutional law than is Wilkinson. Californians amended their 
constitution to make the right to privacy inalienable. To protect this right ” 
they expressly provided that it is to be infringed only for a "compelling 
interest." This Court's leading right to privacy case, White v Davi.: 13 Cal. 3d
at 757, is in accord that only a "compelling interest" justifies an invasion of 
privacy in California.
Wjlkipgon is fatally flawed because it essentially holds that invading a 
Californian's right to privacy is permissible as long as the means used are 
reasonable" and "minimally intrusive." Californians intended the right to 
privacy to prevent government and business from snooping into their 
private lives. They did not intend, as the ballot amendment shows, that 
public or private Interests can violate a Californian's privacy and compile 
personal information as long as this is done stealthily, "reasonably" or with 
"minimal intrusion." That, however, is the nucleus of the Wilkinson 
holding, and that is why it is erroneous.
C^l^fomia does not use the federal Fourth Amendment "balancing 
test" to determine whether a violation of the right to privacy is
justified.
The NCAA suggests that California's right to privacy should be 
adjudicated using the federal Fourth Amendment balancing test.^ Contrary 
to this suggestion is that California voters have mandated, and California's 
Constitution and courts require, that a Californian's right to privacy be 
protected by the compelling interest test, not by the less demanding Fourth 
Amendment balancing test. Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. 218 
Cal. App. 3d at 20; Sibi Soroka v. Davton Hudson Cbrp. 91 Daily Journal 
D.AR. at 13207. Authoritative construction of the California Constitution is 
left to the California Supreme Court, "informed but untrammeled by the
»^e NCAA dies Doylp v. State l^ar 32 Cal. 3d 12. 20 (1982). for the proposition that * any 
daimed Invasion of privacy must be balanced against the need for disclosure." Hill v Nahnnal
Cpllegiatg Athletic Ass’n . 223 Cal. App 3d 1642, 1653 (1990). In Doi^e the court held that------
though privacy extends to confidential financial information, adequate safeguards existed In 
the admimstratfve subpoena procedures to prevent unnecessaiy infringement of finandal
privacy, fisyle at 12. ^oyle's privacy analysis Is distinguishable in that it dealt with the 
need for discovery in a quasi-judicial setting.
United States Supreme Court's reading of parallel provisions" Reynolds v. 
^Vp^ripr CptJTt 12 Cal. 3d 834, 842 (1974). Since the respondents in the instant 
case rest their claim on Article I, Section I of the California Constitution, Hill 
^.Natipnal CpHegiate Athletic AssH 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1656, the California 
Supreme Court, nofthe United States Supreme Court bears the ultimate 
responsibility for resolving this matter.
Contraiy to the NCAA's assertions, the Fourth Amendment federal 
balancing test is much less stringent than California's compelling interest test. 
Dispositive is the simple fact that the Fourth Amendment only protects U.S. 
citizens from '‘unreasonable searches and seizures." Whether or not there is 
a compelling reason for the search and seizure is not a consideration. Under 
California s Constitution, a "compelling interest" is expressly required before 
a public or private entity can infringe a citizen's right to privacy.
QlHalloran v. University of Washington. 679 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. 
Wa.,1988), a federal case upholding the NCAA drug program, demonstrates 
the insufficient protection the Fourth Amendment balancing test would 
provide California's right to privacy. Entirely consistent with the balancing 
test, the Q ^allofap court refused to "substitute its judgment for the expertise 
of those who developed the NCAA testing program" Id at 1004. This 
allowed the court to make uncritical findings that it could never make using 
the compelling interest test.
First, the court found that the NCAA could justify drug testing by 
simply showing that there were reasonable grounds to believe that drug 
testing would turn up positive drug tests. Id, at 1004. Second, as evidence 
that the drug problem among student-athletes is sufficient enough to require
drug testing the court cited the news media's "widely publicized*^ incidents 
of drug use among athletes. Last, the court accepted the self-interested 
testimony of a Dr. Dugal, who helped develop the NCAA's drug testing 
program, ii at 1005, that drug use threatened the integrity of NCAA sports 
and can be countered only through invasive urinalysis drug testing.
Most striking about O'Halloran is its uncritical acceptance of the 
NCAA's proffered justifications for drug testing and willingness to defer to its 
■judgment." Although this may be proper when using the federal balancing 
test, courts of this state clearly hold that the compelling interest test places a 
heavier burden on the NCAA than does the Fourth Amendment privacy 
analysis. Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. 218 Cal. App. 3d at 20.
In City of Santa Barbara v, Adamson. 27 Cal. 3d 123 (1980), this Court expressly 
refused to rely on federal precedent to restrict the scope of California's right to 
privacy. The federal right, they noted, "appears to be narrower than what the 
voters approved in 1972 when they added privacy to the California 
Constitution." Id. at 130, n. 3.
California s right to impose higher constitutional standards cannot be 
seriously questioned. People v. Brisendine 13 Cal. 3d 548, 549 at n. 17. The 
right to privacy has special significance in California and is specifically 
guaranteed in the California Constitution. This elevation of the right of 
privacy to constitutional stature was intended to expand, not contract, privacy
forten v. University of San Francisco 64 Cal. App. 3d at 829. In
^Nothing illustrates the paper-thin protection the Fourth Amendment balancing test provides 
prtvaty rights more than Q’f-tallOfajVs use of the media's drug problem coverage to buttress Its 
finding that the NCAA Is justified in urinalysis drug testing student-athletes. As the NCAA's 
own 1985 study conduded, overall use of anabolic steroids, far and away the most abused drug 
among college athletes, is much lower than estimates provided in the popular press (2 CT 
111.) Under the compelling interest test it is facts, not media-hyped public perception which 
drive a court's privacy rights analysis. ^
contrast to California's explicit privacy protection, the federal Constitution 
does not expressly mention a privacy right. Quite purposefully, California’s 
constitutional right to privacy is more extensive than that guaranteed by the 
federal Constitution. Committee To Defend Reproductive Rights v. Mvers. 29 
Cal. 3d at 262-263.
Urinalysis drug testing infringes upon a Californian's right tn
privacy.
California s Courts and the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously hold 
that urinalysis drug testing 'intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society 
has long recognized as reasonable." Skinner v. Railway Tj^hnr Exec. Ass'n..
489 U.S. at 617 gee, also. Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.. 218 Cal. 
App. 3d at 17; Wilkinson y. Times Mirror Corp 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1048. 
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the 
passing of urine." Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n 489 US. at 617
The collection and testing of urine intrudes upon the right to privacy 
in at least two ways. Rrst, the act of urination itself implicates privacy 
interests because the student-athlete must produce a urine specimen while 
under the continuous observation of an NCAA monitor^Luck v. Southern 
Pacific Transportation Qo., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 15. Second, private medical 
facts about the athlete are revealed through the chemical analysis of the 
urine, A person's medical profile is an area of privacy infinitely more 
intimate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas already
Procedural guidelines regarding specimen collection state in pertinent part that a crew 
member (Urine Donor Validator) will be assigned to the student-athlete tor continuous 
observation within the station. 5.22. The student-athlete will select a new beaker that is 
sealed ^ plastic bag and will be accompanied by the crew member until a specimen of at 
east 1^1. preferably 2D0ml, is pTovided.52.4. [f the specimen is incomplete or inadequate, 
the student-athlete must remain in the collection area under observation of the validator until 
the sample is completed. (2 CT. 135.)
judicially recognized and protected." E)ivision of Med. Quality v Gherardmi 
93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 678 (1979). Thus, "it cannot be seriously argued that the 
collecting and testing of urine does not intrude... upon reasonable
expectations of privacy." Wilkinson v. Times Min-or Corp,. 215 Cal. App. 3d 
at 1048.
III. THE NCAA DOES NOT HAVE A "COMPELLING INTEREST* IN 
TESTING STUDENT-ATHLETES FOR DRUGS.
Though the constitutional right to privacy does not prohibit all 
incursion into individual privacy, any such intervention must be justified by 
a compelling interest. Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. 218 Cal. 
App. 3d at 20 [citing White v. Davis 13 Cal. 3d at 775 and Long Beach 
Employees Association v. City of Long Beach. 41 Cal. 3d 937, 948 (1986)]. The 
"heavy burden of establishing a compelling interest safeguards fundamental 
constitutional rights: if a state or private entity wants to curtail a 
constitutional right it must have a strong reason for doing so. The law must 
be shown "necessaiy, and not merely rationally related to, the 
accomplishment of a permissible policy." City of Carmel bv-the-Sea v. Young. 
2 Cal. 2d 259, 268 (1970). At trial the NCAA did not establish that its invasive 
drug testing program is justified by a compelling interest. ' 1
is no widespread or statistically significant use of drugs 
apiong student-athletes to justify urinalysis drug testing
Both plaintiff and defense experts testified that drugs were no mora^
problem among student athletes than among the general student populace. (2
The tnal court found that the NCAA's proffered -compelling interest- in the preface to its 
drug testing manual. Therein the NCAA claims the program's goal is to protect the health and 
safety of Us athletes and insure that no athlete has a drug-induced competitive advantace 
over another. Preface. The 1987-8R NCAA Drug Testing Manualat ? (2C.T. 129.)
CT. 138.) The court noted that the NCAA drug tests <2 showed "remarkably 
little drug use by student athletes involved in NCAA competition." Hill v.
'^PP- 3d at 1660'3 As admitted by NCAA consultant Dr. 
Daniel Hanley, the great majority of student-athletes simply do not abuse 
drugs. (RT 125: 21-24). The NCAA has shown no quantitative reason why
student-athletes should be subjected to "guilty until proven innocent" drug 
testing.
The NCAA incorrectly contends that the low positive rate shows that 
their program is deterring drug use. To the contrary, substantial evidence and 
common sense prove that the low positive rate indicates low drug use among
student-athletes, not that the NCAA drug testing program is deterring drug 
use.
For example, there was no drop in drug test positives from the 1986- 
1987 testing period to the 1987-1988 period, as one would expect if the program 
were deterring drug use.'"^ The numbers simply do not show that urinalysis 
drug testing is deterring drug use. In fact, as an NCAA expert admitted, 
instituting a punitive drug testing program may actually convince some
athletes of the efficacy of drugs in enhancing athletic performance and lead to 
more drug use. (1 R.T. 75; 19-25.)
34 ^itlves out of 3311 tested athletes, for a rate of less than 1% 
g bles were football players, 25 of whom were steroid positive (S R.C 7) There
gymnastics, indoor lacrosse sPftb^
swimming-diving tennis, volleyball or wrestling (S.R.C 5.) There were no positives in
” -me 1987-88 lest also revealed aJ^a^eMe positives, with aH occurtng in football players for steroid^se. (S.R.C 6)
fou^in the
positives were slightly higher in the 1987-1988 period than in the 1986-1987 
^riod. In the former the rate was 14%, In the latter It was less man 1.0%. (^RC 6 2 CT 51:
Also, it is difficult to see how the NCAA's program logically could 
deter drug use. The, NCAA only tests athletes who make it to a 
championship event. (2 R.T. 251:12-13.) Even then, only a fraction of the 
players on a championship team arc tested. (2 R.T. 251:17-19.) How this 
could deter the great majority of NCAA athletes who do not have a chance of 
making it to a championship event is unclear. The program seems aimed 
more at student-athletes who play on teams that are a perennial power in a 
given sport than at student-athletes at large.
In short, athletes who are irresponsible and short sighted enough to 
use drugs in the first place will probably continue to use them, especially in 
the face of a drug testing program that poses so remote a threat as the 
NCAAs. This leads to one conclusion: the stable, low percentage of drug 
positives in the 1985 Michigan State study (2 CT. 105.) and the NCAA 1986- 
1988 drug tests simply demonstrate low drug use among student-athletes.
The numbers do not show that the NCAA's program is deterring drug use.
The NCAA has no qualitative "compelling interest" in subjecting 
student-athletes to urinalysis drug testing.
This country has a strong tradition of not patemalistically protecting its 
citizens from behavior society deems harmful, especially where such 
protection intrudes upon individual constitutional rights. Though more 
authoritarian countries may laugh at our permissiveness, we recognized long 
ago that utopic societies can only be built with police powers inimical to 
privacy, freedom and liberty.
It is therefore no accident that none of the recent United States 
Supreme Court drug testing cases, which have heavily influence the drug
testing jurisprudence of California's courts,'^ entertain the argument that 
drug testing is acceptable because it protects the health of those tested. Se& 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive's Association. 489 U.S. 602 and Nat'1 
Treasuty Employees Union v. Von Raab. 489 US. 656. As applied by some 
California courts, these cases stand for the proposition that a testing entity 
must show a "safety rationale" to justify drug testing. Luck v. Southern 
Pacific Transportation Co, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 23. The Luck court ruled that 
non-safety related justifications such as deterrence, creating a drug-free 
environment, efficiency and competence do not justify drug testing. at 23- 
24.
The issue in Skinner. 489 U.S. 607 was whether the government's 
interest in preventing train and railyard accidents outweighed the right of 
railroad employees to be free from the search and seizure represented by a 
random drug test. Based on evidence that clearly showed a substantive 
relationship between drug and alcohol abuse and accidents which caused 
numerous deaths, toxic spills and property damages in the millions of dollars, 
id. at 607, the court found the governmental interest sufficient to justify the 
search and seizure.
In Natl Treasure Employees Union v. Von Raab. 489 U.S. at 674, the 
court considered the same Fourth Amendment issue but in the context of 
customs agents involved in interdicting drug smugglers. The court upheld 
the infringement of the Fourth Amendment right, citing the "extraordinary 
safety and national security hazards that would attend the promotion of drug 
users to positions that require the carrying of firearms or the interdiction of 
controlled substances." Id
' ^See. eg.. Luck v. Southern Pacific. 218 Cal. App. 3d 1, and Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp. 
215 Cal. App. 3d 1034.
NCAA student-athletes hit baseballs, run footballs, swim, shoot baskets 
and do a number of other things, none of which remotely approach the 
importance or potential public danger of operating a thousand ton train or 
interdicting drug smugglers. As the Von Raab court wrote, "some of the 
privacy interests implicated by the toxological testing at issue reasonably 
might be viewed as significant in other contexts." Von Raab 489 U.S. at 658. 
This is such a context.
There is no evidence that a college athlete has injured him or herself 
or others in the course of competition because of drug use. (S.R.C. 8.) Where 
there is no other reason for drug testing than to protect the athlete from him 
or herself, the resulting invasion of privacy is intolerable and the testing 
program fails constitutionally. Private entities and governmental entities do 
not exist to make us perfect citizens, especially at the cost of our individual 
rights.
The NCAA cannot prove that anv drug is capable of enhancing
athletic performance, thereby invalidating its assertion that
there is a "compelling interest" in eliminating drug-induced
advantage from college sports.
Although the idea of one athlete gaining a drug-induced advantage 
over another violates societal notions of fair play, the NCAA cannot 
demonstrate that drugs are capable of enhancing athletic performance. The 
NCAAs proffered compelling interest" of eliminating drug induced 
advantage is little more than a hollow fear incapable of supporting the drug 
testing program's constitutionality.
The-NCAA’s Special Drug Committee, set up to form the drug testing" 
program, concluded that drugs do not enhance athletic performance. (S.R.C 
6.) In fact, all experts at trial admitted that most of the 2,600 banned 
substances would impair rather than enhance performance. (S.R.C 6.)
Defendant's expert and NCAA consultant Dr. Hanley agrees that most drugs 
do not enhance performance (1 RT 80: 23-25.). and admits that his own 
studies show no consistent drug-induced benefit to a well-trained athlete. (1 
RT. 82: 26 - 83: 2.) Of all the banned drugs on the NCAA list, only steroids 
seem remotely capable of inducing a competitive advantage.' ^ This 
conclusion, however, is extremely speculative.
Steroids increase their user's muscle mass, so they are perceived as 
being helpful only to athletes in strength sports, such as football. (2 RT. 262: 
3"9.) Outside of this narrow use they are unhelpful to physical performance. 
They do not increase one's cardiovascular conditioning (2 RT. 258: 22-26.) It 
is not even clear if steroids really increase muscle mass and strength. The 
main mechanism through which steroids increase weight is through salt and 
water retention, neither of which increases strength. (2 R.T 265: 9.)
Although there is some increase in the protein component of the muscle 
through steroid use (2 RT 265: 4-7.), it is difficult to saparate out the 
motivational and placebo effects of the drug from the artificially induced 
component. (2 RT. 260: 1-6.) One study comparing groups of athletes using 
steroids, high protein diets, placebos and nothing at all showed that 
motivation was the determining factor in increased athletic performance. (2 
RT. 261:14-19.) Athletes on steroids showed no increase in athletic 
performance over those who were not on steroids.
In short, the NCAA wants to sacrifice a student-athlete's right to 
privacy for the "goal" of eliminating "drug-induced advantage," which the 
record shows is not a problem in the first place. The NCAA^ hysterical
16 Amphetamine, perhaps the second most abused drug among athletes^ does not enhance 
athletic performance. NCAA expert Dr. Hanle/s own studies showed that speed skaters 
whose urine showed traces of amphetamines were losers." (t RT. 83:19.) Other studies 
showed essentially the same thing for wei^t lifters. (1 RT. 83.)
approach to the issue is illustrated by the following questioning of Stanford 
linebacker Barry McKeever:
Q: Well, my question is, doni you think the appeal [of NCAA sports) 
to the public is because it is ... clean ... (and) fairly conducted? (TJhey 
[the public) have to think that the games aren't fixed, don't they? . ;. 
And they also want to feel that the players aren't playing under the 
influence of some strange drug that gives them better performance 
than what otherwise they would have, dont they?
(2 R.T. 408; 4-17.)
The scientific evidence simply does not support such overblown concern. 
There simply is no problem in college sports with athletes popping pills and 
turning themselves into athletic supermen.
Even though it has no scientific proof that drug use is actually affecting 
the outcome of NCAA sporting events, the NCAA feels, nevertheless, that it 
has a compelling interest" in proving to sports fans that its events are 
clean . As NCAA consultant Dr. Hanley contended, "the public deserves the 
right to know that that contest was conducted without drugs." (1 R.T. 48: IS­
IS.)
The privacy rights of college athletes should not be sacrificed to counter 
unfounded public perception. As one United States Supreme Court justice 
has remarked, "the impairment of individual liberties cannot be the means of 
making a point." Von Raab, 489 U S. at 687 (Scalia, J., dissenting), which is 
exactly what the NCAA program is without more substance and justification. 
The NCAA has no compelling interest in subjecting college athletes to 
urinalysis-drug testing. __
MSLQLTEST BEFORE IT CAN 
REQUIRE STUDENT-ATHLETES TO WAIVE THEIR
PARTIcSATION'^M^iT”'^ ^ CONDITION TO
PARTICIPATION IN ATHLETIC COMPETITION.
The NCAA may not condition the privilege of competing in
intercollegiate sports on the waiver of the student-athlete's constitutional
right to privacy. In I23nslciri v gan Diego Unified Schnni r>jct 28 Cal. 2d 536
(1946), Justice Traynor held that "the receipt of a privilege cannot be made
dependent on conditions that would deprive any members of the public of
their constitutional rights" Jd. at 545-546. The NCAA drug-teshng program
requires that all student-athletes, prior to seasonal competition, sign a form
"consenting" to random drug testing.l7 Thus, the privilege of competing in
intercollegiate sports is conditioned on a waiver of the student-athlete's right 
to privacy.
Even though the NCAA is under no obligation to provide a sports 
program, once it does so, it cannot confer the privilege on a selective basis 
that excludes certain individuals because they seek to exercise a constitutional 
"8^*- £gmmittgg To Defend ReproductivP Rights v Mvprc 90 r:.i ixq 
262. In varying contexts, California courts have repeatedly reaffirmed this 
principle, gge. gg.,farnsh v. Civil Service Cnmmj<;<;inp aa f[p|<i7)
Qty of Carmel-hv-the-Sea v Ynimg 2 Cal. 3d 259 (1967); Finot v Pasarienp rit', 
Pd. of Education 250 Cal. App, 2d 189 (1967); King v. Unemnlnvmpnt Inc 
Appeals Bd., 25 Cal. 3d 199 (1972); Thorton v Department of Human 
Kesources Dev^ 32 Cal. App. 3d 180 (1973).
constitutional riThTfaX"avina a In one's
Stressing that the "government bears a heavy burden of demonstrating 
the practical necessity" for such unequal treatment. Bagiev established a three­
fold inquiry that the entity must satisfy to justify such treatment. Bagiev v. 
Washington Township Hospital Dist.. 65 Cal2d at 505. To justify requiring 
student-athletes to waive their right to privacy as a condition to athletic 
participation, the NCAA must establish that; (1) the testing program relates 
to the purposes of the NCAA regulations which conferred the benefit; (2) the 
utility of imposing the program manifestly outweighs any resulting 
impaiiment of the constitutional right; and (3) there are no alternatives less 
subversive of constitutional rights available. Bagiev v. Washington 
Township Hospital Dist. 65 Cal. 2d at 501-502; Committee To Defend 
Peproductive Rights v. Mvers. 29 Cal. 3d at 269; Hill v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Assri.. 223 Cal. /^pp. 3d 1642,1657.
V. THE NCAA DRUG TESTING PROGRAM DOES NOT SATISFY THE
THREE PRONG BAGLEY TEST OF CONSTITUTIONALITY.
A The NCAA drug testing program does not advance its proffered
"compelling interest"
Prong one of the Bagiev test requires that when a private or 
governmental entity limits a constitutional right, it "bears a heavy burden of 
demonstrating the practical necessity for the limitation. At the very least it 
must establish that the imposed conditions relate to the purposes of the 
legislation which confers the benefit or privilege." Bagiev. 65 Cal. 2d at 505- 
506. Or, as the trial court required, the NCAA must show "that the program 
adoptecTsubstantially advances its goals." (2 CT. 53: 3.). The logic of this 
requirement is clear when a governmental or private entity uses a means 
(drug testing) to an end (the curbing of drug use) that restricts a fundamental 
constitutional right, at the vety least it must show that the end can be
achieved through the proffered means. Otherwise, the "restraints operate 
beyond the sphere of the proffered justification ... [andj advance no 
compelling public interest." Bagiev. 65 Cal. 2d at 502.
In Bagiev, this court struck down an ordinance that required public 
employees to waive their constitutional right to political participation as a 
condition of employment. The offending ordinance failed the Bagiev test's 
first prong in that its "sweeping prohibitions" were "not necessary to the 
successful functioning of the civil service system." Bagiev. 65 Cal. 2d at 508. 
Even though the court noted that the municipalities* proffered reason for the 
restriction - preventing employees from running or campaigning against a 
superior for public office - was valid, this acceptable goal did not justify "[s]o 
broad a rule" as that laid out by the ordinance. Jj^ at 509. In short, this Court 
discourages private and public entities from a scatter gun approach to 
problems involving constitutional rights. Just because the NCAA pursues 
an arguably desirable goal does not insulate its drug testing policy from 
constitutional scrutiny.
The drug testing program first fails prong one of the Bagiev test in the 
unnecessaiy broadness of the banned drug list. This list includes 2,600 
substances, runs to 58 single-spaced pages and still carries the caution that 
"Velated compounds" are banned. (2C.T. 101.) One categoiy of banned drugs, 
the sympathomimetic amines, are frequently found in cold medications, 
allergy tablets and cough syrups. (2 CT. 101.) These drugs, far from harming 
human health, are designed to improve it, but are nevertheless banned by the 
NCAA -Trial testimony indicated a great anxiety by physicians, coaches, — 
trainers over the possibility of giving an athlete a banned substance in a 
necessary drug. (S.R.C 8.) This deters an athlete from self-administering
necessaiy drugs and a doctcsr oc trainer from dispensing a necessary drug. (2 
R.T. 251: 23-26; 2 R.T. 252: 1-7; 2 RT. 383: 25-26; 2 R.T. 384: 1-4.)
The trial court noted that the list’s broadness makes it impossible for a 
student-athlete to know when his or her behavior is innocent, which "raises 
fundamental questions about rights that are deeply embedded in our society.” 
(2 CT. 75: 21-25). Predictability, which our jurisprudence generally seeks to 
encourage in proscriptive laws, rales and regulations, is not a hallmark of the 
NCAA's banned drag list. In the words of the trial court, "(tlhe phrase 'and 
related compounds' really means that no athlete who is prescribed for by his 
doctor can know whether he (or she] is innocent." Hence, the banned drug 
list is unconstitutionally overbroad.
The testing program also does not advance its "compelling interest" in 
that it is procedurally flawed and therefore capable of resulting in false 
positives and other testing inaccuracies. Though some California courts have 
noted that the United States Supreme Court has foreclosed debate on the 
scientific accuracy of drag testing, Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Cnrp 215
Cal.App.3d at 1051, the reliability of testing is foreclosed only when "properly 
conducted." Id at 1051.
In NCAA consultant Dr. Hanle/s'words, "if you're going to control 
drugs in sport, youVe got to do testing and you've got to do good testing 
under a strict protocol where the athlete is protected all the way." (1 RT. 48: 
1-4.) Carl S. Blyth, the NCAA Drug Testing Committee chair, wrote in the 
program's proposal that it is "critical to demonstrate that collection and 
handling-procedures are absolutely consistent from one testing occasion to” 
another." (2 CT. 98.) As Dr. Hanley testified, however, the program had 
many procedural flaws of which he had not been made aware of (1 RT. 95: 10-
12; 1 R.T. 101:15-16.) NCAA athletes are not “^jrotected all the way** under the 
testing program.
For example, although there were numerous improprieties at one 
testing laboratoiy,i8 the crew chief was not aware of the errors and failed to 
file the NCAA protocol designed to protect against such error. (1 R.T. 95:1-9). 
Among the problems, fewer samples were received by the lab than were 
apparently produced by athletes. (1 RT. 96: 1-4.) One sample form that 
lacked complete identification was “assumed" to match a urine sample, an 
assumption that “should not“ (1 RT. 96: 16-22.) have been made under the 
protocol. Many additional problems with identification number legibility 
occurred (1 RT. 96-97.), though none were reported to Dr. Hanley and the 
NCAA drug committee. In Dr. Hanle/s words, the NCAA “has a strange 
feeling of confidentiality in which they don't tell anybody anything.“ (1 RT.
98: 3-4.)
There were other serious laboratory problems the NCAA did not notify 
Dr. Hanley and the drug committee about. One of the labs did not consider 
the performance of two testers to be satisfactory. (1 R.T. 99: 20-24.) The crew 
chiefs had not filled in the drug history portions of a substantial number of 
forms, had failed to note problems with chain of custody forms, and had 
improperly delegated important duties to others. (1 RT 99:1-14.) One crew 
chief destroyed the testing program’s strict confidentiality requirement "right 
from the beginning" (1 RT. 100: 4-14.) when he developed a method for 
identifying test subjects. Disturbingly, he wrote this method down for 
distribution to his co-workers. (1 RT. 100: 4-14.)
'■ecorded, or had failed to record, p h. levels and the specific 
of many samples. (1 R.T. 95: 4-9). The importance of this is magnified in that there are 
only three laboratories which do lab work for the testing program.
Last, the program is aimed only at those who happen to make it to a 
college bowl game or other championship event. (2 RT. 251:11-14.). The 
narrow scope of the testing seems to indicate that the proffered interest is not 
as ‘•compelling" as the NCAA would contend. That the NCAA has taken few 
steps to educate its athletes about the perils of drug use further indicates that 
the Interest is perhaps not as "compelling" as claimed.^ ^
The utility of the NCAA*S drug testing program does not outweigh
the impairment of the constitutional right to privacy.
Prong two of the Bagiev test requires that the "utility of imposing the 
conditions must manifestly outweigh any resulting impairment of 
constitutional rights." Bagiev. 65 Cal. 2d at 506. Applied to the instant case, 
this balancing test weighs heavily in favor of the privacy rights of California's 
college athletes and against invasive drug testing for no compelling reason.
The evidence shows and the trial court found that the NCAA cannot 
demonstrate a "compelling interest" in testing student-athletes for drugs. 
There is no showing that any athlete has harmed him or herself or others in 
the course of an NCAA event because of drug use. (S.R.C 8.) There is no 
evidence that drugs can enhance athletic performance and seriously influence 
the outcome of athletic events. (S.R.C. 6.) There is no showing that drug use 
is more of a problem among student-athletes than among other students. (2 
CT. 138.) Last, though some drugs can harm the health of athletes, courts of 
this state, consistent with the philosophy of this nation, hesitate to allow 
paternalistic intervention into citizen's lives to protect their health, 
particularly when individual constitutional rights are violated in the process. 
Therefore, there is little if any weight on the NCAA's side of the scale.
^^From 1975-1985 the NCAA spent a total of $200,000.00 on drug education. (R.T. 1160) The 
first year of drug testing cost the NCAA $1,000,000.00 (2 CT. 99.)
On the other side of the scale, the NCAA drug testing program severely 
impairs the student-athlete's right to privacy. The courts of this state 
recognize that "it cannot seriously be argued that the collecting and testing of 
urine does not intrude at all upon reasonable expectations of privacy." 
Wi||dn^on, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1048. Furthermore, the NCAA's direct 
observation of student-athletes urinating aggravates the severity of the 
privacy invasion. Urinalysis drug testing infringes one's right to privacy.
Even in the few California courts which have held urinalysis drug 
testing valid in certain circumstances, the NCAA drug testing program as 
formulated would fail constitutionally. For example, the Wilkinson court 
attached great importance to the minimally intrusive nature of the drug 
testing procedure at issue. Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp.. 215 Cal. App. 3d 
at 1048-1049. Wilkinson, in validating the procedure, found it important that 
"(alpplicants [were] not observed while furnishing the samples," Ihe samples 
(were] collected in a medical environment," and Ihe medical histoiy and 
other information provided by the applicants and the results of the urinalysis 
are confidential." Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp.. 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1049.
The current NCAA drug testing procedure is far from "minimally 
intrusive." The NCAA, rather than asking student-athletes to provide a 
sample to a physician in a private medical setting herds them to a 
gymnasium where they wait in line to provide a sample. (2 R.T. 386: 8-13.) 
When the student urinates he or she is watched from close proximity by a 
total stranger to insure the integrity of the sample.20 (2 RT. 389:19-23.) Both 
Bany McKeever and Jennifer Hill testified that they found this procedure —
^^There are alternative ways to insure the Integrity of the samples, such as dyeing the toilet 
water in the bathroom to prevent an athlete from diluting his or her sample. (1 R.T. 65:18.)
The NCAA instead has chosen to insure the integrity of the samples by direct observation of 
the athlete urinating.
“embarrassing," "humiliating" and extremely "uncomfortable." (2 R-T. 417: 
1-2; 2 R.T. 391: 1-2.) Those students who cannot produce a sufficient quantity 
of urine have to guzzle water in front of a monitor and their fellow athletes 
until they can produce a sufficient sample. (2 RT. 391: 23-25.) After filling his 
or her beaker with urine, the athlete must stand in line with the urine to 
await final processing (2 RT. 391:13.)
Once the sample is obtained and sent to the laboratory, there are doubts 
that the medical history and results of the testing are kept confidential. Some 
laboratory crew chiefs seem interested in determining to which team samples 
belong (1 R.T 100: 4-14.) in direct violation of NCAA confidentiality 
requirements. Additionally, if an athlete tests positive and is banned, his or 
her absence from a prominent championship event is as public an airing of a 
positive drug test as possible. Psychiatrist Paul Walters testified to the 
psychological trauma such sudden, humiliating public exposure can have on 
an athlete. (S.R.C 3.) Unlike in Wilkinson, where a positive drug test was 
confidentially reported to a job applicant and resulted in the applicant being 
turned down for a job, an NCAA athlete who tests positive for drugs is 
publicly exposed to those following his or her championship event, which 
violates California's requirement that drug testing results be kept 
confidential.
The NCAA drug testing program is far from "minimally intrusive" 
upon a Californian's right to privacy. To the contrary, it severely intrudes 
upon and is deeply offensive to this right. As the trial and appellate courts 
found, the impairment of a student-athlete's right to privacy far outweighs 
the utility of the NCAA drug testing program.
There are alternatives equally capable of achieving the NCAA's 
goals and less offensive to the privacy rights of college athletes than 
urinalysis drug testing.
The NCAA drug testing program simply is not necessary. To protect 
Californians from the unnecessary restriction of their constitutional rights, 
the final prong of Bagiev requires that the restriction not have an 
"altemativel ] less subversive of constitutional rights" Bagiev 65 Cal. 2d at 
502. There are effective ways the NCAA could combat drug-use among 
college athletes without trampling on their privacy rights.
One of the NCAA's faculty representatives, Dr. Steven Danish testified 
that education and counseling programs without drug testing have enjoyed 
success among student populations. (S.RC 10.) Other experts testified that 
drug education can effectively destroy myths concerning drugs and sports,
such as the placebo effect and the effect of amphetamines. (S.RC 10.) In
short, it is equally effective to teach an athlete that drugs do not enhance 
athletic performance and are harmful to one's health as it is to make the 
point through invasive drug testing and severe sanctions. Unfortunately, the 
NCAA spends very little on drug education programs^* and nothing on drug 
counseling or rehabilitation, (S.RC 10.) so it is difficult to know the exact 
success these programs would have among NCAA student-athletes.
he NCAA also cannot prove why "Veasonable suspicion" is not a 
sufficient criteria by which to judge whether or not a student should be tested 
for drugs. A number of coaches testified that they are so dose to their players 
that they would know if any were using or abusing drugs. (S.R.C 5.) Oie 
expert found it interesting that the NCAA does not require a physical exam,
From 1975-85 the NCAA spent 5200,000 on drug education programs. (S.RC 10) 
in the first year alone cost the NCAA over $1,000,000. (2 CT. 99.)
Drug testing
as this would produce clear evidence of steroid abuse22 Testimony showed 
that a drug testing program for steroids based on reasonable suspicion would 
detect many instances of steroid use. (S.R.C 10.)
The NCAA argues that "reasonable suspicion" is not a valid criteria, as 
competing coaches and players might unjustly accuse each other of drug use 
and demand that the accused by tested (1 R.T 114; 6-11.) This problem could 
be eliminated simply by not allowing opposing athletes and coaches to set the 
drug testing machinery in motion against their opponents.
Testing players on the ground of "reasonable suspicion," reaching out 
to players with drug education and counseling programs and encouraging 
coaches and trainers to watch for and dissuade players from drug use seems 
preferable to a drug testing program that, in the words of one court, "sweeps 
up the innocent with the guilty" Caoua v. City of Plainfield. 643 F. Supp.
1507,1517 (D.N.J. 1986). As the trial and appellate courts found, there are 
viable alternatives to urinalysis drug testing. As such the NCAA drug testing 
program fails the final prong of the Bagiev test and the test as a whole. 
Therefore, the "waiver" of the student-athlete's right to privacy is 
unconstitutional. _ ____________ _ _____
CONCLUSION
This Court should uphold the trial and appellate court decisions 
granting and affirming a permanent injunction against the NCAA's drug 
testing program. The trial court heard the testimony of 14 witnesses and 
reviewedjn excess of 100 exhibits over a period of eight days to reach its 
decision. (2 CT. 78-79.) The appellate court found that a broad range of facts.
« RtTw ““ produces enlarged breast size (gyremasHa), testicular atrophy and acne
California law and California^ Constitution supported the trial court's 
resolution of the case. Californians chose to make the right to privacy 
inalienable and chose to prefect this right by requiring that only a 
"compelling interest" justifies its infringement. This Court should not allow 
public or private entities to slowly whittle this rifiht away.
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